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Introduction 
 
This paper tests a simple hypothesis: that given the occurrence of war between two countries, the 
country that is more egalitarian at the moment of military decision is likely to emerge the victor. 
 
In pioneering work, Reiter and Stam (2002) argue that political democracies have a “fourth 
virtue”: victory in war.  They attribute this primarily to better choices of when to initiate wars, to 
better military leadership and to better morale and stronger commitment among the fighting men. 
   
Reiter and Stam’s concept of democracy emphasizes accountability and the formal process of 
selecting government by vote. A drawback of their argument is that democracy so defined is in 
the eye of the beholder; in formal democracies the “consent of the governed” is rarely 
comprehensive.  In particular, slaves were common in self-described democracies until the mid-
19
th century, and women were denied the right to vote almost everywhere until well into the 20
th. 
Yet if one defines such countries as democratic, then how to treat those, like apartheid South 
Africa, which restricted the franchise on racial grounds?
1 The classification of states in 
occupation of other populations, such as modern Israel, is problematic for reasons that differ de 
jure but hardly in practice.  
 
Even allowing an elastic definition, there haven’t been that many wars pitting democratic against 
non-democratic countries.  Reiter and Stam’s entire case rests on just 34 examples of 
democracies at war from 1816 to 1990, of which only 15 represent cases where the democracy is 
classed as the initiator.  
 
Nevertheless, the idea that military decision might rest heavily on a single variable is seductive. 
And if the presence of democracy has some explanatory power, perhaps another variable will 
have even more.  From a research standpoint, the hypothesis of “egalitarian victory” has several 
significant advantages. Most notably, it can be applied in principle to all wars between well-
defined pairs of major combatants.  One party is always more equal, and the other less so. In the 
case of regional or global wars, the comparison may be applied (with less assurance) to well-
defined pair-wise fronts.  The limitation is not conceptual, but only a matter of measurement.   
 
The egalitarian victory hypothesis also avoids a thorny problem facing the democratic victory 
alternative, namely that of distinguishing between “initiators” and “targets,” a distinction deemed 
necessary to excuse cases when democracies lost wars that they would probably have avoided if 
they could have. “Initiators” can be provoked, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in 1914 and 
the Japanese undoubtedly were in 1941.  In any event, the history of how wars started is often 
written differently by the different contestants.   The hypothesis of “egalitarian victory” refers to 
conditions at the moment of military decision, by which time the attribution of blame for the start 
of the war has often lost relevance.  Framed this way, the hypothesis also allows the possibility 
that economic conditions can evolve during the course of war. 
 
                                                 
1  Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) treat apartheid South Africa as a canonical non-democracy.  But it had 
free and fair elections among white voters, including women.  How is a country where women don’t vote a 
democracy, whereas one where people of color don’t vote is not?    3
A priori, why might the more egalitarian belligerent enjoy a military advantage?  We can think 
of three plausible reasons.  First, egalitarian countries have stronger social solidarity, and 
therefore better military morale. Second, inegalitarian countries often structure their armed 
forces to handle internal regime security, at the expense of efficiency in meeting external threats. 
Third, deeply unequal countries face a problem of loyalty in the lower ranks. An egalitarian 
adversary will often be seen as a liberator by at least some substantial part of the home 
population; if prudent it will take military advantage of that image.  
 
This paper examines three classes of evidence.  First, we look at cases where comparative 
economic inequality can be measured directly, using the wide-ranging global data sets of the 
University of Texas Inequality Project for the years 1963-1999. Second, we examine cases where 
reasonable inferences about comparative economic inequality may be drawn by analogy to UTIP 
measurements or from other political and economic evidence, including both bi-national wars 
and larger wars where there existed clear pair-wise fronts. Third, we discuss selected cases where 
inferences may be drawn from literary or historical sources.  We find, all in all, that the evidence 
for an egalitarian victory proposition is remarkably strong. 
 
This conclusion ought to unsettle neoconservative imperialists, if any remain following three 
years of bitter American experience in Iraq.  For it seems that the pursuit of the free market 
economic policy agenda
2 may be mortally destructive to the military effectiveness of the forces 
required to underpin and, in some cases, to implement that agenda.  Conversely, populations that 
band together to resist the encroachment of free markets, global corporations and the mercenaries 
who advance their causes may enjoy a military advantage, hitherto unnoticed, yet frequently 




We offer the hypothesis that when two countries fight a war, the more economically equal 
usually prevails. We need therefore to define three terms: “country,” “war,” and “economically 
equal.”  
 
To begin with, we restrict our attention to wars between territorial nation-states in the 
recognizably modern sense of that term.  Greek city-states qualify, as would the Aztecs of 
Mexico and the Incas of Peru.  Tribes such as the Cherokee or the Zulu or the Mahdi Army do 
not qualify, notwithstanding egalitarian social structures and considerable fighting prowess. It is 
accurate to describe these entities as “nations,” but it seems a stretch to qualify them as countries.  
Civil wars only qualify if carried out between territorial entities claiming country status:  the 
U.S. Civil War qualifies, but the Spanish Civil War would not.
3   
 
War we define as a sustained conflict between organized forces, usually leading to military 
decision: win, lose or draw.  Skirmishes, coups and national wars of liberation are excluded, 
except where they were part of a defined bi-national or multi-national conflict, as in the case of 
                                                 
2  These policies are generally known outside the United States as “neoliberal” and comprise the well-
known “Washington Consensus” recommendations of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
3  The Chinese and Russian civil wars were fought between entities that held well-defined territories for 
long times; however despite the obvious temptation to count them for our hypothesis we exclude them.   4
Vietnam.   Massacres, riots and revolutions are also not wars.  For a list of candidate-wars, we 
use the well-established Correlates of War data set for conflicts going back to 1815.  
 
Finally, there is the problem of defining “economic equality.”  Here we emphasize relative 
equality in the structure of economic earnings, especially pay, as this represents our best 
comparative measure of the social structure of a country, closely related to, but not exactly the 
same as, measures of income inequality by person or household. It is a variable for which we 
have the most direct and reliable measurements in the modern period, and the best chance of 
making reasonable inferences with respect to earlier times.  We shall discuss the inequality 
measures in detail in the next section.  
 
Inequality Measures and Methods 
 
The University of Texas Inequality project has developed a nearly comprehensive worldwide 
data set of annual measures of pay inequality for the years 1963 to 1999, with nearly 3,200 
observations.  The measures are calculated from the Industrial Statistics compiled by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), using the between-groups component of 
Theil’s T statistic, calculated across industrial sectors. Extensive testing of this data set against 
familiar alternatives with less coverage–the Luxembourg Income Studies and the World Bank’s 
Deininger and Squire data set–shows it to be a reliable index both of differences in inequality 
levels between countries and of changes through time, and a good instrument for income 
inequality where these are reliably observed (Galbraith and Kum 2005).  Detailed discussion of 
the construction of long and dense time-series of inequality using Theil’s T measured across 
grouped data can be found in Conceição and Galbraith (2000) and Conceição, Galbraith and 
Bradford (2001).   
 
The UTIP data provide support—elusive in other recent research—for the venerable Kuznets 
hypothesis of a downward sloping relationship between equality and per capita GDP in the mid- 
and later stages of industrial development.  They are consistent with Kuznets’ view that the 
evolution of inequality results primarily from intersectoral transitions, preeminently from 
agriculture to industry. They also suggest that inequality rises with income in some of the most 
advanced countries, a proposition Conceição and Galbraith (2001) have denoted the “augmented 
Kuznets hypothesis,” which they associate with the provision of advanced technology goods to 
world markets, hence a pro-cyclical bent in the movement of inequality. 
 
Thus, in the range in which most countries fall, lower economic inequality is associated to some 
extent with greater industrialization and with higher income levels, both of which might be 
presumed to confer military advantage.  We will not attempt here to disentangle these influences, 
although we can easily point to examples–Vietnam leaps to mind--where the more egalitarian 
country prevailed in war despite having a lower income and little industry. Our interest is not so 
much in the mechanisms relating inequality to military effectiveness—we have already identified 
three separate channels whereby egalitarianism per se may affect military performance, and see 
no need to distinguish between them. Rather, our concern is with the usefulness of the measure 
as a marker for victory in war. 
   5
The UTIP data set permits pairwise cross-country comparisons of inequality as far back as 1963.  
However the characteristic patterns revealed by the data set may be used to infer the relative 
degree of inequality in a wide variety of cases going back at least to the middle of the 18
th 
century.  For relatively recent decades, absent compelling reasons to think otherwise, we can 
simply assume that the relationships prevailing in the UTIP data were also those at the time of 
war. For earlier periods, we will refer to the traditional Kuznets hypothesis and historical 
sources, and associate known characteristics of the warring societies with relative egalitarianism 
as revealed in the UTIP data for modern times.  
 
For instance, political variables are strongly associated with inequality in the UTIP data. 
Therefore, for earlier years we shall generally believe republics to be more egalitarian than 
monarchies and empires. We generally believe democratic republics to be more egalitarian than 
the fascist variety, and social democracies more egalitarian still. We shall hold the communist 
states, from 1917 forward, to be (to have been) the most egalitarian of all.   (Military 
effectiveness is of course not the only criterion for system survival.) 
.  
Equality and Victory 1963-1999 
 
We examine 32 international conflicts between recognized states from 1962 to present.  For each 
conflict, we use the UTIP measure of pay inequality for the year the conflict ended, or the year 
the state exited the conflict. Of 32 conflicts and 42 potential pairwise comparisons (in the cases 
of multi-party wars), we present data for 23 conflicts and 31 match-ups.  Where data are only 
available for years other than the year the conflict ceased, we impute data to the ending year 
from the nearest available measurement.  Of the 31 comparisons, 13 use imputed data.  The 
median distance from which these data are imputed is 2 years.
4 
 
Figure 1 shows the results of these comparisons.  Of the 31 conflict pairs analyzed, the wage 
distribution was more equal in the winning country in 23 cases.  A directional Wilcoxon signed 
rank test for the statistical significance of this relationship shows hat the relationship between the 
equality of the state and victory is statistically significant at the alpha=0.001 level (Z=-3.258). 
 
A substantial share of the measurable conflicts represents pairings in the Middle East, with Israel 
on one side and various Arab states on the other.  In the early days, Israel had a strong collective 
tradition, and it prevailed repeatedly against larger but highly inegalitarian monarchies and 
oligarchies in the surrounding region.  More recently, the adversary Israel faces has become 
ascetic and egalitarian in ways that emulate the distant past of Zionism, while Israel has 
experienced one of the largest proportionate increases in inequality observed anywhere in the 
world.   Meanwhile Israel’s comparative military effectiveness has clearly declined: it was 
chased from South Lebanon by Hezbollah, and it shows no sign of overcoming Palestinian 
resistance to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the effective leadership of which has 
now passed from the autocratic Al-Fatah movement to the egalitarian and ascetic Hamas.  
 
 
                                                 
4 We exclude one conflict, the Mauritanian-Senegalese Border War, due to an 11-year gap in available data.   6
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The value of this approach is demonstrated by the fact that in 13 of the 31 comparisons (42 
percent of the total), the democratic victory thesis is unable to make a prediction because neither 
of the belligerents was democratic.  Of these 13 cases, the equality thesis correctly predicted 11.
5  
A directional Wilcoxon signed rank test for this relationship shows that it is statistically 
significant at the alpha=0.01 level (Z=-2.359).   
 
A democracy was involved in 15 of the 32 interstate conflicts during the study period and 
accounted for 20 of the 42 potential pairwise comparisons.  In this match-up the income 
inequality thesis has better coverage, but its predictive accuracy is lower than “democratic 
victory.”  In particular, the democratic victory thesis correctly predicts the winner of the three 
India-Pakistan conflicts, and the equality thesis does not.   
 
Table 1 
Comparison of the Democratic and Equality Victory Theses 
 








(15/32) 47%  (20/42) 48%  (20/21) 95% 
Equality Thesis  (23/32) 72%  (31/42) 74%  (23/31) 74% 
                                                 
5 The incorrectly predicted cases were Saudi Arabia versus Iraq in the First Gulf War and Ethiopia versus 
Eritrea.   7
 
 
But even in the India-Pakistan cases, the final judgment is not clearly adverse. For, what is the 
correct measure of inequality for Pakistan in 1965 and 1971?  While the UTIP measures find that 
both West and East Pakistan are more equal than India, the substantial income gap between them 
is unaccounted for in our calculations.  Adding in the West-East differential for Pakistan before 
the birth of Bangladesh at the end of the 1971 war might reverse the verdict as to which 
combatant was the more egalitarian.
6 
 
Of the other incorrect predictions, two relate to Cyprus and one pairing (Saudi Arabia-Iraq in 
1991) pits a country that was a minor player in a war decided by the armed forces of the United 
States, which at that time was substantially more egalitarian than Iraq.   
 
Analysis of Conflict Pairs with Missing Data 
 
Table 2 displays the 11 conflict pairs for which we are missing data from at least one party.  Of 
these pairs, six (Grenada, the 2001 Afghanistan War, the United States and South Vietnam 
versus North Vietnam, and the United States and the United Kingdom in the Second Gulf War) 
were won by the more equal state(s), so far as we are able to determine.   In three cases (the 
Kampuchean-Thai border war, the Sino-Vietnamese war, and the Ossetian War) the more equal 
state is unclear.  In two cases (the Libyan-Egypt War and the Mauritania-Senegal Border War) 
both the more equal state and the victor are unclear. In no case is there clear evidence of the less 
equal state winning the war.  Adding the six predicted pairs to the Correct Prediction column in 
Table 1 would raise the predictive efficiency of the equality hypothesis to 78 percent. 
 
Table 2 
List of Conflict Pairs with Missing Data 
 
♦  Afghanistan War (United States-Afghanistan) 
♦  Invasion of Grenada (United States) 
♦  Kampuchean-Thai Border War (Thailand) 
♦  Libyan-Egyptian War 
♦  Mauritania-Senegal Border War 
♦  Ossetian War (USSR/Russia-Georgia) 
♦  Second Gulf War (United Kingdom-Iraq) 
♦  Second Gulf War (United States-Iraq) 
♦  Sino-Vietnamese War (China) 
♦  Vietnam War, South Vietnam-North Vietnam 
♦  Vietnam War, United States-North Vietnam 
 
Note: The Second Gulf War ended in 2003.  Conflict since the fall of the Ba’athist regime is counted as Iraq Civil 
War (2003-Present); however this classification is arbitrary and debatable.  Bold indicates victor. 
 
Reiter and Stam offer a total of 34 conflicts between 1816 and 1990 in which democracies 
participated on one side; of these democracies prevailed in 26, or 74 percent (p. 29).  Thus in 
their analysis (as opposed to our matched sample of conflict pairs), the predictive force of the 
                                                 
6  We thank Steve Marglin for calling attention to this point.    8
democratic form of government is not any greater, and may be slightly less, than that of the 
egalitarian victory hypothesis.  It is only when Reiter and Stam distinguish between initiators and 
targets in warfare that the percentage of democratic victories rises to 93 percent, or 14 cases out 
of 15.   Since wars always involve a more equal and a less equal contestant, the egalitarian 
victory hypothesis disregards the distinction between initiator and target, which we regard in any 
event as overly open to manipulation to be entirely trustworthy.  
 
In sum, an analysis of the best available data for equality shows that it is a strong predictor of 
success in interstate warfare.  This analysis also shows that equality applies successfully to a 
larger universe of cases than the democratic victory thesis, and its predictive power is at least 
equally good, if one disregards the initiator/target filter.  
 
Equality and Victory: 1715-1962. 
 
On a more speculative note, we next offer selected cases of major wars in the modern period, 
with brief comments on the relative equality of the two sides.  
 
With few exceptions, prior to modern national income accounting the inequality measures that 
we favor are unavailable.  Yet, given the Kuznets relationship, information on the degree of 
industrial development, on quantities and types of imports and exports, and on population shares 
engaged in manufacturing and agriculture are able to reveal degrees of economic stratification 
(Williamson 1991). Social and religious stratification are also good proxies for economic 
inequality, especially in the early modern period. For instance, though the distribution of 
household income cannot be estimated from extant sources, we do know that Manipur adopted a 
highly stratified caste system in the centuries prior to their disastrous wars with Burma. Burmese 
society was largely pastoral with relatively egalitarian land tenure (Harvey 1967, pp. 228-42; 
Lieberman 2003; Reid 1990).  
 
In the history of this period we encounter the upward-sloping section of the Kuznets curve. The 
early stages of industrial development and growth generate increased economic inequality as the 
economy segments into agricultural and (much wealthier) urban elements (Kuznets 1955; see 
also Williamson 1985, 1989; and van Zanden 1995). For pre-industrial and industrializing 
societies, the Kuznets relationship has been shown to be highly predictive of inequality 
(Williamson 1991), provided that the agricultural sector consists of small free-holds, as it did in 
(say) the northern United States before the Civil War.  Kuznets would no doubt have taken a 




We first extend our analysis to 1816, if only for the reason that previous explanatory models also 
benchmark their analyses to that year, Napoleon having been vanquished for good in 1815. 
Later, we delve further into history, testing our hypothesis in an era when democracies did not go 
to war, because there were no democracies at all.  
 
We examined 80 international interstate conflicts between 1816 and 1962. A number of the 
conflicts involved dozens of state actors. For these, we counted only those most crucial to the   9
conflict (for instance, Argentina or Uruguay in the Second World War did not make the list). We 
do not compare contestants pairwise as coalitional wars would comprise the majority of data-
points in our list, yet coalitional conflicts are about a quarter of all wars. The data would not 
support pairwise comparison, especially for the minor contestants.  
 
In these years, the more equal side won 64 of the 80 conflicts (80 percent). The null hypothesis 
of no effect, or equal likelihood, gives a standardized score of Z=-5.5 (α<0.0001).  
 
Writing of Europe, van Zanden (1995, 650) holds, “the origins of the Kuznets curve must be 
located in the early modern period”. Taking our analysis back a century further to 1716, the 
pattern of egalitarian victory persists, with the more egalitarian states prevailing in 92 percent of 
cases.  Of the 26 one-on-one conflicts, just five contestants (Russia, Spain, Burma, Persia, and 
Great Britain) participated in all but two. Seven one-on-one conflicts pitting Siam against in turn 
Burma, Vietnam, and Laos, are excluded for lack of conclusive historical information (see 
Harvey 1967, 219-39; Terweil 1983, ix, 29-51).  
 
Overall, the analysis gives the following results.  From 1962 through 1999, the more egalitarian 
country prevailed in 31 of 42 pair-wise comparisons.  From 1816 to 1962, restricting our 
attention to bi-national wars, the more egalitarian country prevailed in 64 of 80 cases.  From 
1715 to 1815, the proportion was 24 of 26.   Taking all together, we find the presumptively more 
egalitarian country prevailed in 119 of 148 cases.  The appendix provides a list of covered 
conflicts.  
 
Selected Cases  
 
The case of Oriental despotism–as far as possible from modern-day democracy–epitomizes 
several key elements of our argument. In its purest form, oriental despotism is an absolutist 
monarchy admitting only one person superior in rank.  Economic inequality can, however, vary 
greatly within these societies. During the early modern period, the often-warring Afghans, 
Persians, and Ottomans all shared a despotic-monarchical structure (Issawi 1984). However, in 
terms of degree of social and economic stratification, they differed, and this is borne out in their 
relative success at war. 
 
The Afghan and Persian kingdoms followed what Machiavelli called the maxims of Eastern 
princes: they “stretch[ed] [the king’s] authority so far as to leave no distinction of rank among 
his subjects but what proceeds immediately from himself: no advantages of birth, no hereditary 
honors and possession….”  In contrast, the Ottoman state behaved like other European states, 
“leav[ing] other sources of honor besides his smile and favor” (Hume 1953, 17-18).  
 
In part because of the failure of the Osmanli dynasty to produce sane, competent sultans, and in 
part to facilitate commerce, the Ottoman Empire adopted an extensive bureaucratic state. 
Originally the gloved hand of oriental despotism, the bureaucracy gained increasing autonomy, 
diluting the Porte’s political power. In the process of political leveling, the bureaucrats also 
introduced lucrative monopolies and guilds, creating gross economic and social inequalities 
(Baer 1970).  
   10
Findley (1986) tallied payroll accounts from the Ottoman state and found mean wages for 
bureaucrats far exceeded medians, as expected under the Tanzimat elite (see also Issawi, 1980).  
Thus the Ottoman Empire was highly inegalitarian. The Ottoman Turks lost 14 of the 19 wars in 
our dataset, with each loss delivered by more egalitarian hands.  
 
Persia perfected Oriental despotism under the rulership of a Shah, or ‘King of Kings.’ In both his 
Persian Letters (1721) and The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu used Persian rulership as 
the archetype for absolutism. However, Persian society was economically egalitarian throughout 
most of the 18
th and 19
th centuries (Lambton, 1953; Abrahamian, 1974). Persia’s earlier Safavid 
dynasty (1501-1736) collapsed due to its inability to balance internal and external security. The 
Safavid court’s great opulence undermined traditional tribal loyalties upon which their power 
really rested.  
 
The Safavid dynasty’s successors, the Qajars, dealt with the same diffuse tribes, poverty, and 
historical enemies, along with a new rival, the Russians. Despite these disadvantages, Qajar 
Persia’s fighting prowess actually increased. Unlike their predecessors, the Qajar kings, tribal 
leaders and officials did not enrich themselves relative to the masses and lived side-by-side with 
them (Lambton 1953). In fact, the Qajars had no standing army whatsoever.  As one Shah 
boasted, “I have neither an army nor the ammunition to supply an army” (Abrahamian 1974, 11).  
Yet Persia was among the most victorious of the large powers, winning 6 of 8 wars from 1716-
1816.   
 
The later Qajar shahs attempted to consolidate their power at the expense of their various tribes. 
In doing so, they increased the size of the bureaucracy and the military, polarizing Persian 
society into a military and bureaucratic elite, on the one hand, and traditional tribal and 
agricultural populations on the other (Gilbar 1978).  From 1828-1911, Persia’s military fortunes 
reversed, with Persia losing all five of the wars in which she fought.  
 
The canonical debut of the modern republic comes with the creation of the American and the 
French revolutions, both of which were immediately cast into wars against imperial opponents 
using, in part, mercenary forces. The republic founded on the idea that “all men are created 
equal” fought its way to victory in 1783, while that founded on “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” 
achieved surprising victory over multiple enemies in 1799.  The fledgling United States then 
suffered ignominious defeat in even-more-egalitarian Canada in 1812, before redeeming itself in 
battle at New Orleans against the British on January 8, 1815, in a battle in which Creoles and 
free men of color were deeply engaged.  
 
Meanwhile France had regressed from Republic to Empire, and as Napoleon became more 
imperial he became less militarily effective; as early as 1803 he was beaten in Haiti by the self-
freed slaves of Toussaint L’Ouverture.  It is impossible from the present remove to judge the 
relative equalities of (say) France and Russia as a whole in 1812, but it is very plausible to argue 
that the French Empire, whose Grande Armée was drawn heavily from Poland and other Slavic 
lands, was less egalitarian than the Cossacks it faced at Borodino.  It is even more probable that 
the France of 1815 was less egalitarian than the British, if not the Prussians, that Napoleon faced 
at Waterloo. 
   11
The American Civil War was, from the point of view of both sides, a conflict between territorial 
entities with well-defined borders.  The Confederacy considered itself to be, and in 1860 for 
practical purposes was, an independent nation state.  It was also a slave-owners’ oligarchy, 
commanding the loyalty neither of its black slaves nor of many of its property-less white settlers, 
especially in such regions as Western Virginia (which seceded from Virginia in order to stay in 
the Union), and eastern Tennessee (from which Lincoln’s 1864 running mate, Andrew Johnson, 
was chosen).  The Union, on the other hand, was a land of relatively small farmers and an 
emerging industrial working class; by 1864 it was arguably (after Haiti) the most egalitarian 
republic in history.  Karl Marx saw the social difference clearly, and in early 1865 penned his 
famous letter of congratulation to Abraham Lincoln, which begins, “From the commencement of 
the titanic strife, the workingmen of Europe felt instinctively that the star spangled banner 
carried the destiny of their class.”   Enough said on that score. 
 
In the 1850s, the rising bourgeois states of France and Britain defeated the decaying Russian 
Empire in the Crimea. In 1870, France was beaten by Prussia in a lightning campaign that ended 
at Sedan.  Prussia was at that time an emerging industrial power; but by 1870 France had been a 
retrograde empire under Napoleon II for two decades.  By 1914, on the other hand, France had 
been a republic for 44 years, and its industrial development had progressed to a point comparable 
to Germany’s, though in a smaller country.  A strong socialist workers’ movement had by then 
emerged; arguably France in 1914 was at least as egalitarian as the German empire. The 
comparison with the United Kingdom is less clear, but in any event the result on the Western 
Front was stalemate to the point of exhaustion, resolved only by the intervention in 1917 of that 
relatively egalitarian republic, the United States. On other World War I fronts, Germany was 
surely more egalitarian than Tsarist Russia, which collapsed early in the war.  The decrepit 
Ottoman Empire was a major casualty of the war, but on the other hand the secular, nationalist 
and relatively egalitarian Turkey that emerged from its ruins proved highly effective against the 
British at Gallipoli, and in driving the Greeks from Asia Minor in the immediate aftermath of the 
war.  
 
From 1932-1935 Bolivia defeated Paraguay in a bloody conflict known as the Chaco Wars.  
According to the UTIP data, Paraguay is today the most unequal country of Latin America and 
one of the most unequal in the world;  Bolivia (alongside fellow-combatants Argentina and 
Brazil) are unequal but less so.  
 
France suffered the Great Depression severely, something that the UTIP data teach us is almost 
certain to generate rising inequality (see for instance, Calmon, Conceição, Galbraith and Garza, 
2000).  Though France did elect a Popular Front government in 1936, it did not engage in the 
broad spectrum of expansionary policies and military rearmament that returned Germany to full 
employment in the late 1930s.  By 1940, relative inequality in France would likely have risen 
very sharply, while that in Germany almost surely declined in the early years of Nazi rule.  
Germany was probably not more egalitarian than Czechoslovakia in 1938, and it is a tragedy of 
history that the Czechoslovaks were betrayed and chose not to defend themselves.  Germany in 
1939 was, on the other hand, probably more egalitarian than aristocratic Poland.  Certainly on the 
other side the Soviet Union was more egalitarian than Poland by that point.  
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In 1905, Japan was a rising industrial power and a cohesive state, facts which enabled Japan to 
make mincemeat of the Russian Navy before Port Arthur.  Japan was also surely a more 
egalitarian state than the China it invaded in 1933, and of which it had conquered large portions 
before initiating conflict with the United States in December of 1941. 
  
World War II proper presents a plethora of comparisons.  Perhaps the most important are the 
USSR against Germany, the United States against Japan, the United States against Germany and 
Italy, and Great Britain against Germany. In all of these, we believe, the plausible case is that the 
more egalitarian country prevailed.  As Galbraith and Ferguson (2001) have shown, war 
mobilization in the United States produced a radical leveling of the wage and income structure 
within a year after the start of the war.  Something similar undoubtedly happened in Britain, 
though not in Germany where social structures were rigorously preserved by the Nazis and 
women excluded, largely, from the industrial workforce.  
 
The Korean War of 1950-1953 provides a very interesting case, insofar as both halves of the 
peninsula were cut from the same cloth at that time, while the newly-established People’s 
Republic of China and the United States were then both among the world’s most egalitarian 
countries.  The result of the war—not surprisingly from the standpoint of our hypothesis—was a 
rare draw. 
 
In the wars of the 1950s, nationalists in Vietnam and Algeria chased the French from their 
colonies. France was a moderately egalitarian democratic republic in those days but the 
Vietnamese and Algerians, though not democratic, were surely more egalitarian. Similarly the 
(democratic) Dutch were forced to exit (undemocratic) Indonesia, where a strong communist 
presence continued until it was savagely extinguished in 1965.
7 In 1961, in a small engagement, 
a lightly-armed Cuban militia defeated a CIA-backed brigade of exiles at the Bay of Pigs. 
In 1962, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army made short work of the Indian forces defending 
the Northeast Frontier Agency and Ladakh.  In all of these cases, the more egalitarian side 
prevailed, notwithstanding a much weaker industrial system and lower per capita income.  In 
each of these cases, egalitarian victory occurred despite the fact that in most of these cases the 
losing party would qualify as a democracy while the winning side would not.  
 
What is truly striking about all this is not how easy it is to make a plausible argument for the 
thesis that the more egalitarian power usually prevailed in conflict, notwithstanding adverse 
differences in average income level, industrial development or democratic status.  What is truly 
striking is, rather, how difficult it is to identify unmistakable opposing cases. Unambiguous cases 
of the inegalitarian state prevailing in major bi-national conflict between modern nation-states 
undoubtedly exist.  But aside from India versus Pakistan we have not been able to find them. 
And looking at a list of wars in this period reveals very few instances where one is tempted to 




                                                 
7  And while the British put down an insurrection in Malaya and the U.S. helped suppress one in the 
Philippines, in neither of those cases did the insurrection constitute a full-fledged national movement.   13
Classical Cases:  Athens to Agincourt 
 
The saga of the Peloponnesian wars provides a cautionary tale, known to all school-children, of 
the contest of democracy against a hyper-egalitarian martial state.   Reiter and Stam quote 
Herodotus on the rise of Athens, but while they take him to be speaking of popular government, 
equality is the word he actually uses: 
 
“It is not only in respect of one thing but of everything that equality and free speech are clearly a 
good; take the case of Athens, which under the rule princes proved to be no better in war than 
any of her neighbors, but once rid of those princes, was far the first of all.”  (Reiter and Stam, 61)  
Very curiously, the index of Democracies at War contains no entry for Sparta. 
 
The Punic Wars are a bit harder to read, as both Rome and Carthage were empires, though the 
former had been a republic and the reach of the latter was greater, making it possibly less 
egalitarian on both counts.  The decline and fall of the Roman empire is another school tale; by 
the time Alaric sacked Rome in AD 410 it was surely far less egalitarian than its attackers.  
Indeed, Procopius of Caesarea gives an account of just how the inequalities of Rome led to its 
capture: 
 
“Among the youths in the army whose beards had not yet grown, but who 
had just come of age, [Alaric] chose out three hundred whom he knew to 
be of good birth and possessed of valor beyond their years, and told them 
secretly that he was about to make a present of them to certain of the 
patricians in Rome, pretending that they were slaves. And he instructed 
them that, as soon as they got inside the houses of those men, they should 
display much gentleness and moderation and serve them eagerly in 
whatever tasks should be laid upon them by their owners; and he further 
directed them that not long afterwards, on an appointed day at midday, 
when all those who were to be their masters would most likely be already 
asleep after their meal, they should all come to the gate called Salarian and 
with a sudden rush kill the guards, who would have no previous 
knowledge of the plot, and open the gates as quickly as possible.”  
(Procopius 1953-4) 
 
Neither Rome nor Carthage figure in the index to Reiter and Stam. 
 
  Like the armies of Alexander, the Golden Horde of Tamurlane, Genghis Khan and Attila 
owed their vast military success in part to a comparatively flat hierarchy; nomadic tribes 
everywhere are more broadly egalitarian than the domains they ravage. The Moghul conquest of 
India provides an even stronger case, for it was a religious war, in which the Islamic armies from 
the North repudiated the Hindu caste system that they faced. Islam won its Indian converts 
heavily from the lowest castes.  
  
  The Spanish conquest of the Americas likewise took advantage of divisions in the deeply 
hierarchical territorial empires that the small bands of Cortes and Pizarro stumbled into. On the 
other hand, few would doubt that Elizabethan England was more egalitarian than the Spain of   14
Philip II; Sir Francis Drake epitomizes the rise of the common privateer on merit rather than 
birth.  
 
Our final example is perhaps the most clear-cut. At Agincourt, the British triumph rests in the 
historical record on the military effectiveness of the Welsh longbowmen – a yeomen’s cohort 
with no equivalent in the French army. We also have the immortal encounter of King Hal, in 
disguise, with Pistol, on Crispin’s Eve: 
 
PISTOL  
Discuss unto me; art thou officer? 
Or art thou base, common and popular? 
 
KING HENRY V  
I am a gentleman of a company. 
 
PISTOL  
Trail'st thou the puissant pike? 
 
KING HENRY V  
Even so. What are you? 
 
PISTOL  
As good a gentleman as the emperor. 
 
KING HENRY V  






Democracies are generally speaking egalitarian in comparison with most other forms of 
government, and so the hypothesis of democratic victory has a certain amount in common with 
the hypothesis of egalitarian victory. Where the cases overlap, they explain many of the same 
things and for similar reasons.  However, we have demonstrated that a focus on equality carries 
substantially more persuasive power, for at least the following reasons: 
 
First, few combatants qualify as democracies, and among those that do, the claim of democratic 
status is often contestable.  Democracy is, after all, an ideal type. The accepted indicators of 
democracy are a complex scale of attributes, subject to methodological variation (such as 
different weightings on different attributes) that might conceivably change the rankings.   On the 
other hand, all wars are in principle between more and less egalitarian combatants. 
Measurements of inequality done in the manner prescribed are standard and uniform from one 
country to the next, leaving little room for method-driven variations.  
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Second, the hypothesis of democratic victory relies heavily on an accurate distinction between 
initiators and targets. But this too is problematic and contestable ground.  On the other hand, the 
hypothesis of egalitarian victory focuses on conditions at the moment of military decision, and 
expresses no interest in how a war may have begun.  
 
Third, where direct measurement is available in the modern period, the egalitarian victory 
hypothesis accurately predicts the outcome in a wide majority of cases.   
 
Fourth, it is possible to make reasonable conjectures about relative inequality for a wide range of 
earlier wars.  While it is always possible that this exercise is contaminated by prior knowledge of 
the victors, in many cases the differences in social system are so stark as to make the direction of 
difference, if not its magnitude, reasonably clear-cut.  For many earlier wars literary and 
historical evidence can be found; indeed the commentary on the importance of solidarity in 
military effectiveness and the rot that sets in with wealth and hierarchy is virtually omnipresent 
in classical discussions of military outcomes.  In virtually all of these cases, lore and legend hold 
that the more egalitarian society is likely to prevail. 
 
Fifth and finally, there have been a handful of wars in which democracies were pitted against 
states more egalitarian than themselves, providing a discriminating test of the two conjectures.  
These were the twentieth century’s wars over communism:  among them the Allied expedition to 
Archangel in 1920, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.  In all of these cases the communist 
country prevailed (or, in the case of Korea, fought a much richer and more powerful country to a 
draw).  In fact, there appears to be no case in which a communist country, however small or 
underdeveloped, suffered ultimate military defeat at the hands of any less egalitarian state.   
 
All of this raises questions that ought to be disturbing to those who believe a free-market 
economic order can be combined with sustained military dominance in the modern world. The 
Iraq war notably features an occupying power that has seen inequality rise dramatically since the 
days of its greatest martial glory a half century ago. The American military is under obvious 
stress from this fact, for the simple reason (among others) that as a career it cannot compete for 
the services of the prosperous. On the other side, the Iraq of 2003 was a highly unequal country 
of Sunni overlords and rebellious Shiite underlings.  But the Iraqi insurgency of 2006 represents 
an egalitarian mini-state in central Iraq, directed by a very effective secret police. From the 
standpoint of the egalitarian victory hypothesis, it is no surprise to us that the tables have turned. 
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Appendix:  Wars, Victors, and Equality        
      
Conflicts Victor  Defeated  Victor  More 
     Egalitarian?
Austro-Turkish War of 1716-18  Austria  Ottoman Empire  1
Russo-Persian War of 1722-23  Russia  Persia  1
Persian-Afghan War of 1726-38  Persia  Afghanistan  1
Turko-Persian War of 1730-36  Persia  Ottoman Empire  1
Spanish-Portuguese War of 1735-37  Spain  Portugal  1
Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39  Russia  Ottoman Empire  1
Austro-Turkish War of 1737-39  Austria  Ottoman Empire  1
Persian Invasion of Mogul India (1738-39)  Persia  Moghul India  1
Turko-Persian War of 1743-47  Persia  Ottoman Empire  1
Carnatic War, First (1744-48)  Great Britain  France  0
Carnatic War, Second (1749-54)  Great Britain  France  0
Burmese-Manipuri War of 1755-58  Burma  Manipur  1
Spanish-Portuguese War of 1762  Spain  Portugal  1
Burmese-Manipuri War of 1764  Burma  Manipur  1
Burmese-Chinese War of 1765-69  Burma  China  1
Catherine the Great's First War with the Turks (1768-
74)  Russia Ottoman  Empire  1
Burmese-Manipuri War of 1770  Burma  Manipur  1
Dutch War of 1780-84  Great Britain  Holland  1
Catherine the Great's Second War with the Turks 
(1787-92) Russia  Ottoman  Empire  1
Persian-Afghan War of 1798  Persia  Afghanistan  1
Russo-Persian War of 1804-13  Russia  Persia  1
Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12  Russia  Ottoman Empire  1
Russo-Swedish War of 1808-9  Russia  Sweden  1
Anglo-Dutch War in Java (1810-11)  Great Britain  Holland  1
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (1812)  Russia  France  1
Algerine War (1815)  U.S.  Spain  1
Persian-Afghan War of 1816  Persia  Afghanistan  1
War of the Pacific (1821-37)  Chile  Bolivia-Peru  0
Argentine-Brazilian War of 1825-28  Uruguay-Argentina  Brazil  1
Russo-Persian War of 1825-28  Russia  Persia  0    24
Miguelite Wars (1828-34)  Britain-France-Spain-Portugal Absolutists/Holy  Alliance  1
Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29  Russia  Ottoman Empire  1
Siamese-Cambodian War of 1831-34  Siam  Cambodia  1
Abd el-Kader, First War of (1832-34)  Algeria-Morocco  France  1
Turko-Egyptian War, First (1832-33) Egypt  Ottoman  Empire  1
Abd el-Kader, Second War of (1835-37)  Algeria-Morocco  France  1
Persian-Afghan War of 1836-38  Afghanistan  Persia  1
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, War of the (1836-
39)  Chile Bolivia-Peru 0
Pastry War (1838)  France  Mexico  1
Turko-Egyptian War, Second (1839-41) 
Ottoman Empire-Great Britain-
Russia  Egypt 0
Afghan War, First (1839-42)  Afghanistan  Great Britain  1
Opium War, First (1839-42)  France  China  0
Peruvian-Bolivian War of 1841  Bolivia  Peru  1
Siamese-Vietnamese War of 1841-45  Siam  Vietnam  1
Sikh War, First (1845-46)  Great Britain  Punjab  1
Mexican War (1846-47)  U.S.  Mexico  1
Sikh War, Second (1848-49)  Great Britain  Punjab  1
Anglo-Burmese War, Second (1852)  Great Britain  Burma  1
Turko-Montenegrin War, First (1852-53)  Montenegro  Ottoman Empire  1
Crimean War (1853-56)  Western Powers  Russia  1
Walker's Invasion of Mexico (1853-54)  United States  Mexico  1
Persian-Afghan War of 1855-57  Afghanistan  Persia  1
Walker's Invasion of Nicaragua (1855-57) United  States  Nicaragua  1
Anglo-Persian War of 1856-57  Great Britain-Afghanistan  Persia  1
Opium War, Second (1856-60) 
France-Great Britain-U.S.-
Russia China  0
Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859-60  Spain  Morocco  0
Civil War, U.S. (1861-65)  Union  Confederacy  1
Mexican-French War of 1861-67  Mexico  France  1
Turko-Montenegrin War, Second (1861-62) Ottoman  Empire  Montenegro  0
Ecuadoran-Colombian War of 1863  Colombia  Ecuador  1
Meiji Restoration (1863-68)  U.S.  Tokugawa Shogunate  1
Shimonoseki War (1863-64) 
France-Netherlands-Great 
Britain-U.S. Japan  1
Danish-Prussian War of 1864  Denmark & Allies  Prussia  1  25
Paraguayan War (1864-70)  BRAZIL-Argentina-Uruguay Paraguay  1
Spanish-Peruvian War of 1864-66  Peru-Bolivia-Ecuador Spain  1
Seven Weeks' War (1866)  Prussian states-Italy  Austria  1
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)  Prussia  France  1
Ethiopian-Egyptian War of 1875-77  Ethiopia  Egypt  1
Serbo-Turkish War of 1876-78  Ottoman Empire  Serbia  0
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78  Russia  Ottoman Empire  1
Afghan War, Second (1878-80)  Great Britain  Afghanistan  0
Pacific War  Chile  Bolivia-Peru  0
Boer War, First (1880-81)  South Africa (Boer Republic)  Great Britain  1
Sino-French War of 1883-85  France  China  0
Guatemalan War (1885)  El Salvador  Guatemala  1
Russo-Afghan War of 1885  Russia  Afghanistan  1
Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885-86  Bulgaria  Serbia  1
Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887-89  Italy-Great Britain  Ethiopia  0
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95  Japan  China  1
Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895-96  Ethiopia  Italy  1
Greco-Turkish War of 1897  Ottoman Empire  Greece  0
Spanish-American War (1898)  U.S.  Spain  1
Boer War, Second or Great (1899-1902)  Great Britain  South African Republic  1
Boxer Uprising (1899-1901)  Western Powers  China  1
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5  Japan  Russia  1
Honduran-Nicaraguan War of 1907  Nicaragua  Honduras  1
Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12  Ottoman Empire  Italy  0
Russo-Persian War of 1911  Russia  Persia  1
Balkan War, First (1912-13)  Greece-Serbia-Bulgaria-Italy  Ottoman Empire  1
Balkan War, Second (1913)  Greece-Bulgaria-Italy  Ottoman Empire-Serbia  1
World War I (1914-18)  Great Powers  Central Powers  1
Russo-Polish War of 1919-20  Poland  Soviet Union  1
Greco-Turkish War of 1921-22  Turkey  Greece  1
Northern Expedition (1926-28)  Kuomintang (Nationalists)  Northern Warlords  1
Chaco War (1932-35)  Bolivia  Paraguay  1
Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36  Italy  Ethiopia  1
Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45  China-USSR  Japan  1
Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40  USSR  Finland  1
World War II (1939-45)  Allies  Axis  1
French IndoChina War of 1946-54  Vietnam  France  1  26
Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48  India  Pakistan  0
Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49  Israel  Arab Nations  1
Algerian War of 1954-62  Algeria  France  1
Arab-Israeli War of 1956  Israel  Egypt et al.   1
Vietnam War (1956-75)  Democratic Republic of Vietnam  U.S.  1
Sino-Indian Border Dispute (1959-62)  China  India  1  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   